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SPECIAL EFFECTS OF UNIONS IN
HOLLYWOOD
Jan Wilson t
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor relations in the entertainment industry have been overlooked
as a valuable labor model. Although labor relations in Hollywood are
unique in a number of ways, the successes that have been achieved can
provide lessons for labor practitioners in general. Labor negotiations and
collective bargaining agreements typically concern wages, hours, and
working conditions. To that extent, labor issues in the entertainment in-
dustry are typical. Frequently, however, these basic labor principles are
applied atypically in Hollywood to fit the peculiarities of the industry,
and produce atypical results. This article evaluates some of the myriad
labor issues in the entertainment industry, as well as the unique and suc-
cessful application of fundamental labor principles in Hollywood.
A. Why Watch Hollywood Labor?
The juncture of labor relations and the entertainment industry is
both distinctive and deserving of attention. The movie industry is not
only unique, but it is also one of only three industries in the United States
that contributes positively to the balance of trade. The movie industry in
the United States accounts for an estimated three-billion-dollar surplus
balance of trade each year,1 making it the third-largest dollar contributor
to the trade balance.2 The United States leads all other countries in the
number of films exported, the number of countries in which its films are
distributed, and the number of countries whose primary source of films is
the United States.' The United States produces more than ten times the
t Jan Wilson is an attorney in the Washington, D.C. area and vice president of a success-
ful production company in Los Angeles. After 10 years working with the United States Senate
on intellectual property matters and other issues, she recently received an LL.M. in labor law
from Georgetown University, and started her own business. Q 1992 by Jan Wilson.
1. Jack Valenti, Europe 1992-Issues for the United States, Address on Law Day, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center (Apr. 7, 1990). Jack Valenti is the president of the Motion
Picture Association of America.
2. The movie industry is surpassed only by the aerospace and computer industries in their
positive contributions to the balance of trade. Id
3. S. WILDMAN & S. SIWEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FILMS AND TELEVISION PRO-
GRAMS 17, 35 (1988).
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number of films produced by most other countries in the world.' Do-
mestic production of movies in other countries generally accounts for less
than thirty percent of the movies shown in those countries.5 The United
States is the primary supplier of the remaining seventy percent shown.
The success of American films and television productions
in world markets is indicated both by industry trade balances
and by comparisons with other film- and television-exporting
nations .... The United States has historically exported more
than three times the total television programming exports of
the next three leading exporting nations combined.6
The importance of the fim industry is obvious, given that the
United States is far and away the leading global film exporter. The
worldwide impact of the United States television industry is also signifi-
cant. The number of homes around the world with televisions is con-
stantly increasing, resulting in a much larger viewing audience. Between
1960 and 1983, Europe experienced a ten-fold increase in its estimated
number of television receivers, and the increase in Africa was nearly
ninety-fold.7 Hollywood is the primary supplier for the world's seem-
ingly insatiable appetite for programming. The United States' television
industry supplies seventy-five percent of the programming for Latin
America, and forty-four percent of that for Western Europe.8 On the
other hand, both television and film imports into the United States are
minimal-approximately one to two percent.9
Historically, less revenues have entered the United States from tele-
vision than from movies. However, improved technology and interna-
tional relations indicate that increased penetration of television
worldwide is likely. The latest technological advances now make televi-
sion accessible to many parts of the world. In 1969, the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization ("INTELSAT") achieved
global signal coverage when it began operating satellites over the Atlan-
tic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. As a result of that development alone,
4. Id. at 14-17, 35. The United States produces approximately 300 films each year. A
majority of the 92 countries in the United Nations (for whom there are available statistics)
produce 20 or fewer films annually, and only one country had domestic production accounting
for more than 30% of the films shown in that country. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 38. The estimated number of television receivers in Europe in 1960 was
20,973,000. In 1983, the total was approximately 261,744,000. In Africa, the increase during
the same time period went from 122,400 to 9,825,700. Id.
8. Id. at 40.
9. Id.
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television programming increased ten times by 1980. By 1985, the
number of programming hours had increased to three times the 1980
figures.10 As technology continues to improve, each additional area that
gains access to television becomes a market that demands new program-
ming. Thus, Hollywood's future and its role in the national economy
become increasingly important.
Recent policy changes in countries with substantial television mar-
kets have also been significant. Because a detailed discussion of this sub-
ject is beyond the scope of this article, it will be discussed only briefly.
The changes in international relations in the last year alone have opened
up new markets for television in Europe and the former Soviet Union.
The integration of the entertainment industry into labor relations, na-
tional economics, and international trade warrants close attention.
The entertainment industry in the United States is important in an
economic sense, but is it worthy of notice by labor experts? The answer
is yes, because labor unions in Hollywood are very powerful and success-
ful. Labor systems that work are useful models. Labor relations in the
entertainment industry are worthy of study because of the unusual suc-
cess of the labor system in the entertainment industry, as compared to
the experience of labor unions nationwide.
B. Labor in General and a Preview of Its Influence in Hollywood
Unions are based on the premise that collective action of employees
with common goals is the most efficient method to obtain a standardized
agreement with an employer regarding terms and conditions of employ-
ment." In an effort to equalize the bargaining power of employers and
employees negotiating for such agreements, Congress enacted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("Act" or "NLRA")."2 Congress intended to
thwart the ability of the more powerful employer to command substan-
dard wages by pitting employee against employee. The Act's legislative
goal derived from the congressional finding that unequal power impedes
commerce. 13
The goal of Congress to equalize power has been attained by the
10. Id. at 52.
11. W. OBERER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW; COLLETI3VE BARGAINING IN
A FREE SOCIETY, 100-205 (3d ed. 1986).
12. The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1992).
13. Section 1 of the NLRA states, in part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers . . . substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
1992)
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interaction of labor and the entertainment industry. The Hollywood
model realizes the balance of power envisioned in the preamble of the
Act. In achieving this result, the entertainment industry has adapted
federal labor law to fit its particular needs. Use of the same laws by
many other industries, however, has been less successful. This suggests a
need to examine how the Hollywood system has evolved and how it
works.
Labor negotiations in Hollywood are often emotion-filled because
much is at stake for both sides. Because a balance of power exists, in-
tense negotiations are guaranteed. The complexity of the issues exacer-
bates the difficulty in concluding an agreement. Both sides must attempt
to foresee the future in order to write a contract that will be beneficial to
both party's interests even if there are changes over the three-year term
of the contract. International trade markets, developing communication
and transmission technologies, and international copyright are only a few
of the areas affecting the industry that should be considered.
An analysis of the evolution of labor relations in the entertainment
industry provides valuable insights into the labor-management model in
general, although some aspects are unique. For example, the pressure
applied by the media and public are far greater in the entertainment in-
dustry than in a typical goods-producing industry. This visibility that
accompanies the entertainment industry plays a major part in negotia-
tions. The general public may pay little attention to strikes that occur
around the country every day. When Hollywood strikes and reruns
dominate television, however, most American households take notice.
Although their interest may be purely personal, American viewers notice
when their favorite show consists only of reruns. Thus, any degree of
public attention is a factor in negotiations that both sides must consider.
Public pressure translates into monetary consequences in the entertain-
ment industry, an equation that parties to negotiations in Hollywood un-
derstand. Labor negotiators in other industries might well note
Hollywood's negotiating strategies using the media and the impact of
public reaction. 14
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries ....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organ-
ize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1992).
14. Alan S. Jaffe, Performing Institutions and the Labor Unions, 2 VOLUNTEER LAWYERS
FOR THE ARTS 36 (1980). "Labor disputes in the public sector and in the performing arts
impact upon non-participants to a far greater extent than labor disputes in the private sector.
This situation usually triggers rapid press and governmental intervention-factors that would
not be present in the typical commercial confrontation. Indeed, the presence of pressure ap-
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Labor problems and negotiations in Hollywood involve many of the
same issues as labor negotiations in any other industry. In the entertain-
ment industry, the issues over which the parties differ are typically wages
and hours. Usually, actors seek increased wages under a contract and
management seeks wage rollbacks. When negotiations break down and a
strike results, every business in Hollywood suffers repercussions, a phe-
nomenon which occurs in any company town. The typicality of the
Hollywood system ends there, however. Unlike any other industry, with
the exception of sports, bargaining over wages in Hollywood means the
setting of minimum pay scales in a Basic Agreement ("Agreement")
rather than the setting of hourly wages. The Agreement is entered into
with the specific understanding that it is only a point of departure for
further negotiations on individual contracts.
II. THE HISTORY: NOSTALGIA TO NEGOTIATIONS
A. It All Started with the "Rats"
The labor movement in Hollywood began somewhat inauspiciously.
Like the Disney empire, which had its beginning with a mouse, the labor
movement in Hollywood began with the "Rats." In 1914, a group of
actors calling themselves the "White Rats" united to take action against
the unfair conditions suffered by stage actors in general. Their reasons
for forming a union were identical to those of many workers who united
during the early part of the century: long hours, unsafe conditions, few,
if any, benefits, and lack of financial security.
At that time, acting was not a well-respected job, let alone a profes-
sion. Actors were an unlikely group of employees to form a union; how-
ever, "the barbarously unfair conditions of the theater at the turn of the
century made change inevitable."' 5 Tired of rehearsing long weeks for
no pay and of being abandoned penniless in an unfriendly town if a play
closed on the road, actors began to talk of unions. In 1914, the actors
who had formed the White Rats received a charter. Hollywood produ-
cers were hostile to their union, however, and refused to recognize them
as a collective bargaining representative. "Finally, in 1919, the actors
struck, darkening every theater on Broadway. The producers at last sur-
rendered. For the first time in history, a performers' union was contrac-
tually recognized as a legitimate bargaining agent for the profession.''16
plied by the media and public opinion has become an integral part of the collective bargaining
process...." Id.
15. THE MOVIE BUSINESS, AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE 136 (A. William Bluen
& Jason E. Squire eds., 1972).
16. Id.
1992]
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The union became what is known as the Actor's Equity, which has juris-
diction over stage work throughout the United States.
What began as a few people uniting for a common goal in 1914 has
grown to a powerful organization whose members impact the industry
and audiences throughout the world on a daily basis. Most significantly,
this first group led the way for many more organized unions that have
since encompassed the entire entertainment industry. Today, the indus-
try is unionized at every level of employment, from stagehands to writ-
ers, directors, and actors.
B. Act One for the Screen Actors
After the first Hollywood labor strike in 1919, the next major step in
labor reform came with the formation of the Screen Actors Guild in
1933. Like many industries that spawned unions during that time,
Hollywood's working conditions were somewhat dismal. In the early
days of movies and television, being an employed actor was something of
an oxymoron. Actors lucky enough to find employment worked under
contract with one of the major studios.'" No unions or other protections
existed, and the actors had little bargaining power. The Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 19381s had not yet been enacted, and any protective federal
statutes then in force did not apply to the entertainment industry.
Another obstacle to equal bargaining power for employees was the
vertical integration of the production studios.19 The vertical integration
of the studios meant that the studios made the movies, distributed them
through one of their own branches, and showed them in their own thea-
ters.20 Therefore, if a studio decided to shut down its theaters, the obvi-
ous consequence was the termination of a significant amount of its
production. This occurred in 1933 when Paramount Pictures and RKO
General, Inc. declared their theatres bankrupt. 21 Members of the only
17. Harry Bernstein, Harry Bernstein! Labor. Hollywood May Take the Drama out of Set-
tling Disputes, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1989, part 4, at 1.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-217 (1992).
19. See generally United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (explanation of distribution agreements and product markets for movies and television).
The court found a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the distribution and exhibition of
films through a comprehensive scheme which included price fixing, pooling agreements,
formula deals and vertical acquisitions, as well as a number of other methods. United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-174 (1948).
20. For a discussion on the structure of the motion picture industry after Paramount, see
generally Ralph Cassady, Jr., Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Distribution
and Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 150-153 (1958).
21. John Eisendrath, The Making of the Hollywood Working Class: How the Writers'
Strike Drove the Jaguar Owners to the Barricades, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1988, at 14.
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existing Hollywood union were the only employees able to successfully
fend off the ensuing twenty-five to fifty percent pay cuts.
22
In 1948, the United States Supreme Court found that the vertical
integration of the studios violated the antitrust laws, and ordered divesti-
ture.23 Prior to that time, employers had complete power to make unilat-
eral decisions impacting employees. The employers set a competitive
salary of fifteen dollars for a day's work, but the work was not steady and
the day often exceeded eight hours. 24 The length of the work day was
unlimited, and compensation for overtime was not provided. Provision of
benefits that are now mandated by law, such as overtime, days off, and
pay for rehearsal or travel, had to be specifically contracted for by the
actor. Few actors were in a position to command these terms.
Following the studios' decision in 1933 to implement a fifty percent
pay cut,25 the actors decided to form the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG" or
"Guild"). The fifteen actors who attended the first meeting united in an
attempt to withstand the trying times they faced. The Great Depression
had seized the United States, and studio management across the country
negotiated with billy clubs and pinkertons (private detectives).
26
The Guild probably succeeded because respected actors such as
Spencer Tracy, Gary Cooper, James Cagney and Boris Karloff played
key roles in the first meetings.
27
By allying themselves with a group dedicated, as the Guild re-
mains to this day, not to the needs of the star but the require-
ments of the ordinary professional actor, these men
demonstrated the basic justice of the actors' cause. Four years
of harsh struggle lay ahead, but the end was clear. In the
spring of 1937, in a Hollywood boxing arena, President Robert
Montgomery read the scribbled message of agreement which
averted the strike that many feared inevitable, and spelled suc-
cess for the Guild. The studios, however reluctantly, capitu-
lated, and soon reached agreements on the first of the basic
contracts under which all actors work in American films.
28
From the initial group of fifteen actors, the SAG and the American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA"), which negotiate
22. Ia
23. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1988).
24. THE MOVIE BUSINESS, AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 136.
25. Id. at 137.
26. Eisendrath, supra note 21, at 14.
27. THE MOVIE BUSINESS, AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 138.
28. Id
1992]
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jointly, increased to a 1989 membership of approximately 105,000.29 As
the largest union in the entertainment industry, the Guild has become
one of the most powerful and most visible unions. The Guild gained
notoriety in 1980 when a United States President came from its ranks.
With the 1960 election by his fellow union members, former President
Ronald Reagan began his first "presidential" experience as president of
the Screen Actors Guild.30
Organizational efforts by writers followed those of the actors. In
1933, Hollywood writers began their battle with the studios by forming
the Screen Writers Guild ("SWG"). However,
[t]he studio chiefs would have none of it [unionization]. They
fired union writers on Wednesday before Thanksgiving and re-
hired them Friday in order to save a day's pay. When the
SWG persisted in its fight for higher wages and recognition in
1936, the executives, led by [Irving G.] Thalberg, created a
company union. Writers who remained active in the SWG and
refused to join the company union saw their names on a 'gray
list' and found it more difficult to get work.3 '
He headed production at Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer during the 1920's and
1930's. Mr. Thalberg was not alone in resisting, however, as other studio
heads also created problems for the new union.
Three years after the writers aligned with a single union pursuant to
an order of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"),
the writers' union gained recognition, in 1941, with its first contract with
studio producers. Ironically, this recognition helped trigger McCarthy-
ism, which was to ruin many writers' careers. As one commentator
recalled,
In 1947, Jack Warner of Warner Brothers told Congress that
'communists injected 95 percent of their propaganda into films
through the medium of writers.' Ten Hollywood writers were
cited for contempt of Congress-and later blacklisted for refus-
ing to name names. And while most people remember the
29. Actors Unions Ratify Agreement with Motion Picture, TV Producers, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 83, at A-3 (May 2, 1989).
30. Reagan, a former president of the Screen Actors Guild and leader of this union in
a successful strike, was the first head of the labor union to be elected president of the
United States. He is proud both of his union membership and of his negotiating
skills and used his union background in his campaigns to deflect accusations that he
was anti-labor. But when 11,438 air traffic controllers walked off the job on August
3, 1981, Reagan fired them and broke their union.
Lou Cannon, Reagan Leaving Legacy of Surprises; President Did the Unexpected on Soviet
Union, Deficit, Hostages, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1989, at A].
31. Eisendrath, supra note 21, at 16.
LABOR LAW
question, 'Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist party?', few recall it was preceded by 'Are you now
or have you ever been a member of the Writers Guild?'
32
This acrimonious relationship between the writers and producers set the
stage for constructive negotiations between producers and the Writers
Guild of America ("WGA") over the writers' 1988 contract.
III. UNIONS: HOLLYWOOD-STYLE
A. Hollywood Extras: Increased Union Membership
Comparison of the number of unionized workers today to the
number in 1950, or to the number of workers in other countries, reveals
the startling decline in union membership in the United States. Labor
unions have lost an average of 10,000 members each week over the last
decade.33 The number of employees who are organized in unions each
year is only about one-fourth of the number forty years ago. The number
of workers who belong to unions is half of what it was in the 1950's.
31
Hollywood's entertainment industry unions have experienced a very
different trend. The number of workers joining unions in this industry
has increased significantly. Determining the size of the entertainment
work force is difficult because many workers in Hollywood work part-
time or in nontraditional employee-employer relationships. Even in ab-
solute numbers, however, union membership is increasing. For example,
the combined membership of AFTRA and SAG between 1986 and 1989,
increased more than fourteen percent, from approximately 92,000 to ap-
proximately 105,000. 3 - This significant increase was a trend antithetical
to the trend in other industries throughout the rest of the country.36 The
labor movement in general can share this success, however, to the extent
that the success is based on factors common to the labor unions in
general.
The impact of unions in Hollywood is evident not only from the size
of the unions, but also from the number of unions. Movie sets represent
32. Id
33. Paul Goldberg, Address Before the Fifth Annual Illinois Public Sector Labor Rela-
tions Conference (Oct. 6, 1989), in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 203, at A-3 (Oct. 23, 1989).
Paul Goldberg is the Commissioner of the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services.
34. CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM 1 (1989). "Today the unions' share
of the private sector work force is below 16 percent-well under half its peak in 1954-and
there is every indication that it will continue to shrink." Ia
35. Two Actors Unions Authorize Strike Against Movie, Television Producers, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 146, at A-2 (July 30, 1986); Actors Unions Ratify Agreement with Motion
Picture, TV Producers Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 83 at A-3 (May 2, 1989).
36. HECKSCHER, supra note 34.
1992]
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a microcosm of the industry-they are unionized from top to bottom,
like many industrial plants. One commentator has noted that "[ilt is not
unusual for members from as many as 22 unions to work on a movie set
in a single day."3 Union actors, union directors, and union writers work
together with union stagehands, union electricians and union engineers.
Members of numerous unions working on one set is significant because
unions build strength through solidarity in the industry as well as
through solidarity of the members in any given union.
Hollywood employees and employers cannot easily avoid unioniza-
tion.3" While not totally dependent on union membership for work,
workers have limited job possibilities in Hollywood without such mem-
bership. An employee may be denied union membership for a number of
reasons, such as doing union work prior to attaining union membership,
working during a strike, or working on a set that has nonunion employ-
ees. Additionally, the employer must determine which side it will take
regarding union policies, because employment of nonunion personnel
could result in a boycott by vital union employees.
1. Hollywood Exclusive-"No Exclusivity?"
One of the basic principles of union strength is the principle of "ex-
clusivity." '39 Exclusivity mandates that an employer not deal directly
with unionized employees in avoidance of the union, even if one or more
employees initiate negotiations.' The bargaining unit is to serve as the
exclusive representative, protecting its members in negotiations with the
37. Eisendrath, supra note 21, at 14.
38. "The entertainment industry... is highly unionized, with almost all personnel...
members of one or more of the multitude of unions .... The inescapable fact remains that no
organization can function very long or very successfully without confronting the reality of
unionization." Jaffe, supra note 14, at 36.
39. "Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining .. " National
Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1992).
40. The Supreme Court has held that the nation's labor policy does not protect concerted
activity by minority employees to bargain with their employer over issues and thus bypassing
their exclusive bargaining representative.
Protection of such an attempt to bargain would undermine the statutory system of
bargaining through an exclusive, elected representative, impede elected unions' ef-
forts at bettering the working conditions of minority employees, 'and place on the
Employer an unreasonable burden of attempting to placate self-designated represent-
atives of minority groups while abiding by the terms of a valid bargaining agreement
and attempting in good faith to meet whatever demands the bargaining representa-
tive put forth under that agreement.'
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 58 (1975) (quot-
ing the Board determination).
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employer. The employer may bargain only with the employees through
the union, and vice versa. Courts have consistently protected the posi-
tion of the union as the exclusive bargaining representative4 1 by finding
employers guilty of unfair labor practices, in violation of sections 8(a)(5)
and 8(a)(1) of the Act,42 if they deal with an employee individually in an
attempt to undermine the union. Courts do not allow separate bargain-
ing with the employees because it is the antithesis of unionization and
frustrates the efforts and power of the union. Engaging in concerted ac-
tivity43 is at the heart of actions protected by the Act, and interference
with this right through discrimination, discipline or dismissal is
prohibited.
An employee who attempts to circumvent the union by going di-
rectly to the employer not only loses his or her protection under the Act
but may be dismissed without reprisal.' The quid pro quo for the
union's status as exclusive representative is the union's duty to fairly rep-
resent the employees. Circumvention of the union by either employee or
employer complicates this obligation.45 In Hollywood, the obligations on
both sides are further complicated by the way the "standard" union con-
tract is treated.
2. What's Standard in Hollywood?
The general rules that aim toward the creation of a standard union
contract apply in Hollywood. The courts generally do not preclude the
union and the employer from setting minimum terms and conditions of
employment. Therefore, the possibility of employees negotiating individ-
ual contracts is a viable option.46 On the other hand, contracts that
41. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
42. Paragraphs (1) and (5) of section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provide
that: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157;...
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
43. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees employees the right to en-
gage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. To interfere with, or deny such right is
a violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
44. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 71.
45. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see generally Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at
64.
46. The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such
individual advantages. Of course, where there is great variation in circumstances of
employment or capacity of employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to pre-
scribe only minimum rates ... to leave certain areas open to individual bargaining.
But except as so provided, advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of in-
dustrial peace as disadvantages."
1992]
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violate the Guild's Basic Agreement ("Basic Agreement" or "Agree-
ment") by setting terms below the minimum terms set by the Agreement
are generally prohibited.47
In the union workforce, individual contracts with the rank-and-file
workers are the exception rather than the rule-except, of course, in
Hollywood. As stated earlier, nearly all entertainment industry workers
in Hollywood belong to unions, from stagehands to actors, directors and
writers. Although all of the employees work pursuant to union con-
tracts, the contracts set only minimum scales and conditions. The
Agreement is the point from which negotiations on the terms of individ-
ual "deals" for each production begin.
Workers unionize to form a legal monopoly4 8 in order to gain power
to bargain on equal footing with an employer. Federal labor legislation
provided this means in order to end impediments to commerce that arose
where employers generally more powerful than employees dictated sub-
standard wages. This inequality in bargaining power commonly resulted
in employees bidding against each other for jobs--each agreeing to work
for less than the other to secure work. One objective of the original legis-
lation was to establish a level playing field to prevent employers from
coercing employees into underbidding for employment. Standardized
working conditions and wages represented a means to achieve the goal.
Hollywood workers unionized and received standard contracts that al-
lowed each employee the freedom to negotiate individually. As a result
of unionization, employees have successfully returned to one-on-one ne-
gotiations with employers for an individual contract.
3. Personally, What's the Minimum?
Section 5 of the SAG's Basic Agreement reads: "This Agreement
sets forth minimum terms and conditions of employment. Nothing
herein shall prevent the actor from negotiating more favorable terms and
conditions."49 This provision exists in contracts at every level of produc-
tion, including those contracts covering grips, gaffers, makeup artists,
electricians, and wardrobe supervisors, as well as those of writers, actors
and directors. This standard is common, however, only in the entertain-
ment and sports industries. As one expert explained,
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
47. "IThe employer may not incidentally exact or obtain any diminution of his own obli-
gation or any increase of those of employees in the matters covered by collective agreement."
Id. at 339.
48. Unions are exempted from the prohibitions in the antitrust laws. See generally Con-
nell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
49. Screen Actors Guild Basic Agreement.
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It is a concept that is unique to the business, one that simply
does not exist elsewhere. In no other industry does a union
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with an employer
with the specific understanding that the employee can thereaf-
ter meet privately with the employer to seek better terms for
himself than those negotiated by his union.5"
The minimums set by the Agreement do not affect all of the actors,
directors or wardrobe supervisors on whose behalf the Agreement has
been negotiated. Many of these union members can and do demand six
times the minimum,5 yet each retains membership in the appropriate
union or unions. Here, the concerns of the union extend beyond bread
and butter issues, such as wages, to the basic goal of unity to improve the
working conditions for all workers. A standardized contract is the tradi-
tional labor method for promoting the policy of balanced powers because
it derives from the belief that individuals negotiating with their employer
have insufficient bargaining power to conclude a fair agreement.
Hollywood takes a different route to attain the traditional goals of labor
unions. As a result, parties to ordinary negotiations in Hollywood enjoy
equal bargaining power,5" as Congress intended them to.
B. Right-to- Work Statutes
1. Rights Are Complicated with "Right-to-Work"
Scholars of labor law should consider another troublesome issue in
the entertainment industry: "right-to-work" statutes. A number of
states have enacted "right-to-work" legislation which provides relief for
employment discrimination based on membership or non-membership in
a union. In these states, a contract that purports to set minimum scales
for members of the union may be circumvented, allowing members to
work at rates below the minimum scale provided in their contract. 53
50. Jaff'., supra note 14, at 38.
51. Once, the typical Hollywood writer was a full time employee of a studio, and
union negotiations determined compensation. Today, most of the guild's 9,000 mem-
bers are unestablished free-lance writers who sell a script every few years at best. At
the other end of the economic spectrum are 'the hyphenates,' a few hundred im-
mensely successful writers who also direct or produce series.
Neither of these groups is much affected by the minimum pay and royalties
negotiated on their behalf.
Peter Passell, The Striking Writers Miss the Big Picture, L.A. DAILY J., July 6, 1988, at A6.
52. The "parties" here are the union and the producers, who represent management.
There is no doubt that the power of any one member of the union is individualized.
53. Gregory B. Galloway, Right to Work and the Entertainment Industry, FLA. BAR J.,
June 1989, at 84, 86. "[U]nion members may obtain waivers to their agreements and accept
substandard wages." Id. at 86.
1992]
416 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
Although the contract itself does not allow for its circumvention, the
courts have interpreted the right-to-work statute as allowing these ac-
tions despite the contract. Consequently, the practice is commonplace in
a number of states with significant film production, such as Florida.
These "right-to-work" statutes regulate labor unions operating in the
state, but only to the extent that the courts allow state regulation. Addi-
tionally, the statutes provide remedies for employees if an employer re-
fuses to employ a person based on union membership.
The interpretation of these statutes by the courts, however, conflicts
with union security provisions such as "agency shop" clauses, which are
common throughout the entertainment industry. Typically, an agency
shop clause requires every employee to pay an amount equal to the
union's customary initiation fee and monthly dues, beginning a short
time after employment by an employer, or agency shop.' By prohibiting
collection of initiation fees and union dues associated with employment
by agency shops in these states, right-to-work laws frustrate the union's
ability to secure its status." Production companies seeking to reduce
production costs, of which labor constitutes the major component, are
attracted to right-to-work states.56 Union effectiveness is therefore un-
dermined, and the purpose of the agreement is thwarted to the extent
that production increases in these states. As a California court noted,
The very purpose of the Basic Agreement was to put a floor
under... compensation and to prevent producers, with their
obvious leverage, from requiring [members] who for one reason
or another lacked individual leverage, to agree to work for less
money in order to obtain employment. Failure to enforce the
Basic Agreement by sanctioning individual contracts in contra-
vention thereof would render it meaningless.5 "
Hollywood is not the only place where movies are made, but the
union stronghold lies there. The tendency of productions outside
Hollywood to undermine this stronghold" is worrisome in light of recent
increases in productions away from Hollywood. Fourteen years ago,
portions of at least eighty percent of all movies produced were shot in
Hollywood; by 1987, however, that figure had dropped to twenty per-
54. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
55. International Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
56. Galloway, supra note 53, at 86.
57. That Way Prod. Co. v. DGA, 96 Cal. App. 3d 960, 967 (1979).
58. Writers Guild Membership Approves Pact with Producers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
153, at A-14 (Aug. 9, 1988). Herb Steinberg, spokesman for the Alliance, stated that the
Alliance had no choice but to make movies elsewhere, following the breakdown of negotiations
with the Writers Guild. Id.
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cent.59 Today, a number of independent producers have greater flexibil-
ity to film at locations away from Hollywood, and thereby avoid the
higher labor costs associated with that venue.' The flight of production
companies to nonunion sites will continue to diminish the strength of the
unions. In light of the costs involved, the unions should take some action
to counter this trend.
2. Working Without a "Right-to-Work"
Union members can be fined or disciplined, pursuant to their Agree-
ment, for working on nonunion projects or for working below minimum
scale. Unions generally must vigorously enforce rules forbidding these
types of work in order to foster and protect behavior that lies at the heart
of union philosophy. Some producers choose to have a nonunion project
by hiring nonunion members. While this may raise the ire of unions, the
practice is not rare. It is not uncommon in Hollywood for a project to
employ union writers and actors to work next to stagehands or hairdress-
ers who are not members of their respective unions. The combination of
union employees working with nonunion employees causes tension that
is normally resolved in other industries by segregating the workers. This
segregation does not always happen in Hollywood although the courts
have found in a situation analogous to a production set-a construction
site-that integrating union and nonunion employees poses sufficient
dangers to warrant the imposition of rules specific to that industry.6 1
The basis for the court's reasoning in these circumstances was not only to
avoid a potentially dangerous situation for the workers, but also to pre-
serve the union's ability to demand standard wages and working condi-
tions. In the entertainment industry, unions often look the other way
rather than try to discipline the workers and risk their alienation.62 To
the extent the union ignores these infractions, the union loses power. Be-
59. Eisendrath, supra note 21, at 14.
60. Harry Bernstein, Harry Bernstein Labor: Hollywood's Craft Workers Under Pressure to
Take Cuts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, part 4, at 1. "In their seemingly unquenchable thirst
for cheap labor, U.S. companies that make popular cartoon shows for kids and other animated
films began sending a flood of work to Japan. Then, as Japanese costs rose, they began rushing
off to South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines." Id.
61. See generally Markwell and Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert
denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968) (Board adopted special rules regarding picketing applying to the
construction industry because such industry is unique-in much the same way Hollywood is.
The courts noted that where a number of independent contractors, working for a common
employer, come together at a common site, problems can be expected if the entire project is not
union); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
62. Interview with Brenda Wilson, President of Boomtown Productions, Inc., in Los An-
geles, Cal. (Apr. 8, 1990).
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yond this, the unique relationship between labor and entertainment pro-
vides no basis for further predictions regarding the continued viability of
the unions under circumstances involving union and nonunion workers.
C. Hyphenates
1. Then There's the Question Mark of Hyphenates
Recognition by the NLRB is basic to the formation of a union. The
Board certifies a union as the recognized bargaining representative of a
group of employees only if those employees constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit.6" Although the unit seeking certification does not have
to be the most appropriate unit, the Board must find that the unit is "an
appropriate" unit. Similarity or conflict of interests is a significant con-
sideration in the Board's determination of this. For example, supervisors
may belong to the union, but they may not have the right to organize and
bargain collectively, as do their rank-and-file brethren." Allowing su-
pervisors to be members raises the issue of divided loyalty and the possi-
bility of a divided unit. Supervisors may be required to represent the
employer and take positions contrary to union concerns. 65
The entertainment industry's creation of many crossover positions
from employee to supervisor has stirred a legal debate over how to class-
ify an individual in this situation. In American Broadcasting Companies
v. Writers Guild ofAmerica, West, Inc., ('American Broadcasting"),66 the
United States Supreme Court held that executive producers, story edi-
tors, and directors who work for companies producing either motion pic-
ture or television films are "supervisors" within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act.
67
63. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1992).
64. National Labor Relations Act §§ 14(a), 7, 2(3). Section 14(a) provides that supervi-
sors are not prohibited from becoming members of the union; however, coverage of the Act is
limited to "employees." Section 2(3) specifically excludes supervisors from the definition of
employee. The rights of such employees are based on section 7. See generally Lee Modjeska,
The Reagan NLRB, Phase I, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 106 (1985).
65. Comment, Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act and Union Discipline
of Supervisor-Members After Writers Guild: Equipoise of Imbalance?, 1978 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453,
456; Andrew M. Calamari, Union Discipline of Supervisor-Members Working in Nonunion
Shops. 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1158 (1984).
66. 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
67. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11) states:
The term "supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the forego-
ing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
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Executive producers have primary responsibility for the production
of a film and are involved in the decision-making process from the initial
idea through postproduction. The Court in American Broadcasting
found that these duties are typical of those of supervisors. When shoot-
ing a production on-location, producers are also responsible for bargain-
ing with the many labor organizations involved on the set and for
adjusting employee grievances. The Court determined that individuals in
these roles are supervisors even if they are members of a guild.
Story editors may also act as supervisors. They have supervisory
responsibilities, including principally assisting producers in dealing with
scripts and writers. Problems arise when these producers and editors are
also writers or directors who belong to a union in that capacity. Based
on their supervisory duties, the Court in American Broadcasting con-
cluded that story editors are supervisors.
The courts are not alone in their struggle to sort out the roles of
employees in Hollywood. The Board has encountered this problem a
number of times in ruling on whether a unit is an appropriate unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. In making one of its decisions, the
Board visited the set of I Love Lucy at Desilu Television Productions to
determine if a union was qualified to represent certain employees.6 The
Board ruled that the head writer, who was also involved in the produc-
tion of the show, could not be a member of the bargaining unit. Head
writers have control over the story line of each script and edit the final
draft before submission for production. This role gives the head writer
the power and authority to determine the number of casual actors re-
quired for the production and to coordinate the work of the other writ-
ers.69 The Board determined that including the head writer in the
bargaining unit disqualified the union from representing the employees of
the Desilu production company.
While the classification of individuals as employees or supervisors
may be difficult in other industries, in Hollywood the presence of many
individuals who play both roles makes it impossible. The use of "hy-
phenates" in the industry allows employees to fit into categories of both
employee and supervisor. Examples of this trade jargon are "writer-pro-
ducer" and "writer-director," which respectively describe producers and
directors who are also writers and thus members of the Writers Guild.
When these employees are involved in a labor dispute, animosity and
68. Desilu Productions, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 179 (1953).
69. Id at 181.
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legal action are the natural by-products and can lead to interesting
dilemmas.
During strikes, the Writers Guild of America coordinates strike ef-
forts by establishing rules which the members must adhere to during the
strike, including rules requiring members to honor picket lines. The
picket lines impact producers and studios that are being struck when em-
ployee writers refuse to cross the lines to work for them. During a strike,
the loyalty of writer-producers in their dual roles is greatly tested. While
the WGA may question the proper status of hyphenates, the court deci-
sions discussed below provide some explanation of the issue.
2. Writers' Guild Questions Hyphenates: American Broadcasting
a. 1973 Strike
In 1973, the WGA called a strike against the Alliance of Motion
Picture Television Producers ("Alliance"). The complexity of the nego-
tiations and tactics used during the strike necessitated eventual resolu-
tion by the United States Supreme Court in American Broadcasting. In
its decision, the Court delineated permissible union discipline and high-
lighted the difficulties arising from allowing supervisors to remain mem-
bers of the union. 0 During the strike, the WGA, as the representative of
its members, issued strike rules setting forth required as well as forbidden
conduct. Rule 1 forbade any act that was prejudicial to the welfare of the
union, including any conduct tending to defeat a strike or weaken its
effectiveness. Rules 12 and 13 prohibited all members from crossing
picket lines set up at the premises of producers being struck. If any em-
ployees wished to enter these premises for a purpose not forbidden by the
strike rules, they had to first notify the WGA of the entry." The WGA
rules specifically applied to hyphenate members of the union, regardless
of the capacity in which they were working during the strike.7 2
The hyphenates were primarily involved as producers, and thus as
70. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
71. The strike rules included Rule 13, which reads, in part:
Members are prohibited from entering the premises of any struck producer for the
purpose of discussion of the sale of material or contract of employment, regardless of
the time it is to take effect. Members are also prohibited from entering the premises
of any struck producer for the purpose of viewing any film .... (S]hould a member
find it necessary to visit the premises of a struck producer for any reason apart from
the foregoing he should inform the Guild in advance of the nature of the such pro-
spective visit.
Id. at 417 n.3.
72. Id. at 416. Rule 24 provided: "All members, regardless of the capacity in which they
are working, are bound by all strike rules and regulations in the same manner and to the same
extent as members who confine their efforts to writing." Id.
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supervisors. Their duties included the selection and direction of writers
and could include the adjustment of grievances. Any writing duties of
the hyphenates were attributed to their employment as producers rather
than as writers, and any writing that resulted from this role was not spe-
cifically covered by their contract with the WGA.
The WGA made certain that the hyphenates felt more than the
usual pressure incident to a strike. One strike rule looked suspiciously
like a threat to blacklist a hyphenate forever for working during the
strike. The rule prohibited union members from working with any mem-
ber, hyphenates specifically included, who violated the rules. In a further
limitation on the hyphenates' options, the WGA rules prohibited mem-
bers from resigning during a strike, thereby eliminating the possibility of
resignation by the hyphenates in order to continue working as producers.
The hyphenates were in a no-win situation. After the strike, the WGA
disciplined hyphenate members who violated the strike rules. Sanctions
imposed on thirty members included expulsion from the union, suspen-
sion from the union for two years and fines up to $50,000.
Following the strike, members of the Alliance filed a lawsuit against
the WGA, not on behalf of the hyphenates, but to challenge the Guild's
alleged unfair labor practices against the producers as members of the
Alliance." As supervisors, the hyphenates were responsible for adjusting
grievances that arose against the producer. The producers alleged that
the WGA's actions prohibiting hyphenates from working prevented the
producers from selecting the hyphenates as their representatives to adjust
grievances, in violation of the Act.74 The case was heard by an Adminis-
trative Law Judge ("AL"), who held in favor of the producers. On the
WGA's appeal to the National Labor Relations Board, the Board
adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALT. The Board enjoined
the WGA's disciplinary proceedings against the hyphenates, finding that
the Guild had committed an unfair labor practice." The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, in a two-paragraph decision, denied enforce-
ment of the injunctive order and set the stage for the appeal to the
Supreme Court.7 6 The Supreme Court found the Guild had violated the
Act, but in doing so, they left some interesting questions unanswered.
73. 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
74. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents.., to restrain
or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(l)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1992).
75. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 957 (1975).
76. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 547 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1976).
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A typical notice of charges against the hyphenates contained a no-
tice that stated:
Specifically, you are charged with: (1) having crossed the
Guild's picket lines ... during the months of March, April,
May and June 1973, without having informed the Guild in ad-
vance of the nature of your business with said company and
without having obtained a Guild pass to enter said premises; (2)
having during the months of March, April, May and June
1973, rendered services for.., a company against whom the
Guild was at such times on strike; and (3) refusing to perform
picket duties during the strike after having been requested to do
so by representatives of the Guild.7
The WGA's position was that merely crossing the picket line warranted
discipline, regardless of whether or not struck work was performed.
The WGA used the widespread interest in the strike and its ability
to make news to pressure its members. The WGA publicized its rules
and its intent to prosecute any member who violated them. Additionally,
it made clear that membership in the WGA constituted a binding con-
tract with legal consequences. The WGA made public its determinations
of all breaches by members, threatening consequences that included the
term "blacklisted."
During the strike, the WGA issued a press release announcing ac-
tions taken against several named writer-producers. The widely publi-
cized release stated that the charges were based on the members' crossing
picket lines. These members were to be fined and their names listed on a
"Roll of Dishonor" in various Guild publications "in perpetuity so that
Guild members for years to come will never forget ... [the] pariahs who
have betrayed their colleagues."7 " These statements left little doubt that
the WGA intended strictly to enforce their strike rules.
After the suit was filed, the WGA tried to temper its actions by
sending letters to its members stating that it would not threaten illegal
action-"a matter of anathema to this Guild." Expulsion remained a
possible consequence of any rule violation, however, as evidence by the
WGA's explanation that "there is obviously a stigma attached to expul-
sion which might cause individual members of the Guild to refrain from
working for such a person. 71 9 As might be expected, neither the court
nor the Board missed the none-too-veiled attempt to threaten
"blacklisting."
77. American Broadcasting, 437 U.S. at 417 n.5.
78. 217 N.L.R.B. 957, 963-964 (1975).
79. Id.
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The impact of any form of blacklisting is significant. Here, the
threatened individuals included writers who were working in roles as
producers or directors, where they were dependent on writers. The
WGA's rule that no member could work with these producers or direc-
tors not only took away their ability to function as writers, but also de-
prived them of their ability to function as producers. Producers cannot
work without interacting with writers. No writer could approach any
member who had been disciplined by the WGA with an idea for a pro-
duction, let alone work with them on a production. Thus, this rule af-
fected producers beyond their role as a writer or a member of the WGA.
During the strike, the hyphenates also experienced pressure to per-
form the supervisory duties for which they were employed. Employers
sent letters to the hyphenates stating these expectations and setting forth
the legal action that would result from any breach by the hyphenates.30
The employers offered, however, to pay for the hyphenates' defense in
any WGA action against him or her, and to pay any fine levied."'
The trouble was that they wore many hats. In addition to the pro-
ducers, other groups were pressuring the writers. Most belonged to other
unions, who demanded loyalty from them and threatened action for con-
tract violations. For example, the Directors Guild of America ("DGA")
had informed its members that, for violating contracts, "they would be
subject to suits for large damages and other penalties."81 2 While the hy-
phenates technically played a dual role, they felt pressure from more
than just two sides.
The hyphenates tried to juggle cooperating with the WGA and func-
tioning in other roles. They submitted scripts of current projects, offer-
80. Id.
81. Id at 964. The Board reported that the letters typically stated, in pertinent part:
We intend to continue our operations and meet our contractual and moral obli-
gations to supply theatrical and television motion pictures to our customers and the
public.
If you are a member of the Writers Guild you may have received. . . a set of
rules .... We also understand that the Guild may have threatened you with fines
and blacklisting in the event it calls a strike and you render services for us in any
capacity or you fail to report for picket duty. Any attempt of the Guild to interfere
with your services for us in a capacity other than as a writer is unlawful and the
Guild's threat of fines, censure, expulsion and blacklisting is unenforceable.
We expect you to fulfill your contractual obligations to us as a supervisor ....
We trust that you understand that we will have no alternative but to resort to our
legal rights and remedies in the event of a failure on your part to do so. Should the
Guild attempt to fine or otherwise discipline you for meeting such obligations to us,
you will be provided with a defense to any such proceeding, without cost to you, and
you will be indemnified against any fine which might be imposed and which is legally
sustained.
Id.
82. Id.
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ing to submit the script as-shot to prove that no writing had occurred
during the term of the strike. At the WGA's disciplinary hearing, the
employers provided evidence that the hyphenates had not performed
struck work, but the Guild was not interested. The WGA pursued the
matter based strictly on the fact that the members had crossed the picket
lines.
b. Judicial Conclusions
The ALJ and the Supreme Court both noted that the WGA had
professed little or no interest in what kind of work the members had
actually performed during the strike and made no attempt to present
evidence of their doing struck work. The actual evidence indicated that
the hyphenates had performed only ordinary, non-writing functions for
which they were otherwise employed-those of directors, producers or
story editors, but not those of writers.
While somewhat sympathetic to the hyphenates' no-win situation,
the ALJ hearing the case was unsympathetic to the fact that they had, in
fact, crossed picket lines and waited until it was too late to resign from
their positions, thereby taking no mitigating action.83 The ALJ found,
however, that the Guild had committed unfair labor practices. The
judge ordered the WGA to cease and desist from further restraining em-
ployers from using the services of their employees, and from citing or
charging its members with violations of the strike rules. The ALJ also
ordered affirmative action, which included a requirement that the Guild
send notice of the AUL's determination to all of its members. Although
the WGA had nominally retracted its blacklisting rule, the ALJ found
that it had nevertheless made "suggestions" of blacklisting to its mem-
bers and that it would be impossible to "disentangle the consequences
flowing"T M from its use of the hyphenates as examples in highly publi-
cized press releases.
The record indicated that the WGA had mailed strike rules, orders
and other instructions to all of its members, even serving some person-
ally. The WGA's diligent efforts in supplying press releases to local and
trade papers also aided their publicity efforts. The Court in American
Broadcasting found that the ALJ would have been justified in ordering an
equal amount of publicity for its notice of determination, although the
AL! had stopped short of doing so. As part of its decision, the Court
ordered the WGA to send a notice to every member, to publish the no-
83. Id.
84. Id.
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tice in two local trade papers for six consecutive issues, and to post it in
their meeting halls and offices. The notice advised that the fines and ac-
tions against the members had been rescinded and any such record had
been expunged from their records. It further stated that the Guild would
cease to coerce or restrain employers in their choice of employees, and
that the WGA would cease to threaten members.
The split (five-to-four) decision in American Broadcasting evidenced
the Court's struggle in deciding a divisive issue in labor/management
relations. The four dissenting Justices argued that the majority had mis-
construed the National Labor Relations Act, thereby striking down
weapons that were at the heart of union survival.8 5
The Court's holding deprived the WGA of the use of legal strike
weaponry based on the finding that disciplining the hyphenates might
infringe on the employer's right to have those members perform the non-
essential service of adjusting grievances if they arise. Section 8(b)(1)(B)
of the Act86 forbids unions from pressuring an employer in its choice of
employees for the adjustment of grievances. The Guild did not apply any
such pressure; instead, the evidence shows that the Guild was uninter-
ested in what kind of work the member had been hired to do. The
Guild's only concern was whether a member had broken the unified front
critical to the union's survival by crossing the picket line. In the dissent's
words, the "[WGA's] sole purpose was to enforce the traditional kinds of
rules that every union relies on to maintain its organization and solidar-
ity in the face of the potential hardship of a strike.""" Adjusting griev-
ances is incidental to the hyphenates and the employer in their
employment agreement. The impact of the Court's decision on the
union, however, is severe in comparison. As the dissent points out, the
majority's holding renders the enforcement of a strike effort more diffi-
cult for any union with supervisory members.88 The decision allows the
employer to demand loyalty from its hyphenate employees rather than to
give unions the opportunity to win their allegiance during a strike.
The magnitude of the WGA's risk in permitting supervisors to join
the union became obvious only after the Court rendered its decision. If
an employer felt that the loyalty of hyphenate employees was questiona-
ble, and that they were unacceptable risks because they might be be in-
volved in the adjustment of grievances, the employer had the option to
restrict their union membership. As supervisors, these members cannot
85. American Broadcasting, 437 U.S. at 441 (Stewart J., dissenting).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B).
87. American Broadcasting, 437 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 441.
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seek the protection afforded to rank-and-file employees by joining or as-
sisting labor organizations.8 9 Supervisors are not prohibited from joining
these groups, but membership means that the employer has the option
not to consider them as employees for collective bargaining purposes.90
The employer's alternative is to negotiate this option at the collective
bargaining table.
In American Broadcasting, the Court noted that the WGA had rea-
son to believe that their actions were legal. In 1974, the Court had re-
fused to enforce a Board order, ruling that the disciplinary action taken
against supervisory members of a union violated the Act. In Florida
Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, another five-to-four decision, the Court had
concluded that in enacting section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act, Congress had
intended to protect employers only where the union's conduct coerced or
restrained the employer "in choosing its representative for collective bar-
gaining or for grievance adjustment." 9 The Court's interpretation in
Florida Power of this section, when combined with sections of the Act
allowing employers to refuse to consider supervisors as part of the union
for collective bargaining purposes, left an equal balance of power be-
tween employer and employee.92 Conversely, with respect to the WGA,
the American Broadcasting decision tilts the balance dramatically in
favor of the employer.9"
Matters of concern to the parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment are best left to the collective bargaining process. The Supreme
Court's tortured search for standards has distorted the labor/manage-
ment relationship and its bargaining process. By following their decision
in the Florida Power case, the Court in American Broadcasting could
have allowed the parties to resolve the matter at the bargaining table.
Although it determined that the WGA's actions were egregious, the
Court should have found that they were an improper basis for the unfair
labor practice claim. That is not to say that the facts do not warrant the
89. "Section 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory employees the rights to engage in self-
organization, collective bargaining and other concerted activity under the umbrella (protec-
tion) of section 8 of the Act." Lee Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase I 46 OHIo ST. LJ.
95, 104 (1985).
90. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 5 (1947).
91. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
92. Section 14(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becom-
ing or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this
Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employ-
ees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective
bargaining.
93. See Comment, supra note 65.
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Court's finding of an unfair labor practice in violation of the Act. Ample
evidence existed to support this conclusion, but the Court should have
based it on a different clause of the Act allowing claims by union mem-
bers, not employers.94
To the relief of the unions, the impact of the American Broadcasting
decision was short-lived. In 1987, the Court retreated from its majority
stance and held that an employer may not charge an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act unless the employer is currently en-
gaged in a collective bargaining relationship with the union.95 The
Court's holding thus prohibited the filing of unfair labor practice charges
when the representative status of the employee is merely prospective.
Although the Court did not dispute that supervisors are the prime choice
for collective bargaining representatives, the Court abolished the use of
this "reservoir doctrine." This long-standing doctrine recognized that
present union conduct could effectively coerce an employer's future se-
lection of its bargaining representative.96 The Court disavowed the
American Broadcasting standard, finding that the impact of union disci-
pline on an employer's prospective choice of a bargaining representative
was "minimal."97
D. Other Issues Affecting Hollywood Unions
1. Oh, Those Union Blues
The rocky history of the Writers Guild has not been the result of
external pressures. From its formation in 1939, the WGA has had diffi-
culties with the basic goal of unity. The "Union Blues," an appropriately
named splinter group, was formed in opposition to the writers' 1973
strike. In the writers' strike of 1988, another group called the "Writers
Coalition" formed, attempting to split the union ranks and achieve a re-
turn to work.9 Neither effort succeeded, and the WGA remains a viable
union today. Animosity continued after the strike, however, when the
WGA sought to discipline some of the opposition members.
Dissatisfaction and discontent with the union were not restricted to
the splinter groups. Many members who remained in the union during
94. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(1)(A).
95. NLRB v. IBEW, Local 340, 481 U.S. 373 (1987).
96. Patricia Cramer Jenkins, Note, NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, Local 340: Abolition of the Reservoir Doctrine in Union Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 66
N.C. L. REv. 602 (1988).
97. IBEW, 481 U.S. at 592-93.
98. Striking Writers Guild Approves New Interim Pact with Independent Producers, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at A-18 (July 11, 1988).
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the strike did not do so happily. Screenwriter Walter Bernstein com-
pared the 1988 writers' strike to the blacklisting that occurred in
Hollywood of the 1950's.9 9 Recalling the 1950's, he remarked, "At least
then I was able to write under different names. I wasn't happy, but I
worked."'" During the later strikes, however, performing struck work
was prohibited. This meant that WGA members could not solicit writ-
ing projects related to movie or television, or develop projects in conjunc-
tion with producers.
2. Lights, Camera... Strike
Hollywood's share of public attention is arguably rivaled only by
events in sports and politics. The unions in the entertainment industry
are successful in obtaining media and public attention. This power to
attract attention is a phenomenon that must be factored into an examina-
tion of Hollywood unions and their negotiations with producers.
Strikes occur around the country every day, but their impact is re-
stricted primarily to the specific industry and immediate geographic area.
People outside these areas rarely notice. Few people seemed to notice the
bitter workers' strike of Eastern Airlines in March, 1988. When
Hollywood writers struck the producers (Alliance) two months later,
however, not only did brethren unions manning the broadcast booths
inform the world, but every household watching television in the country
was alerted as reruns aired in place of new programming.
Television and movies provide a prime source of entertainment for a
majority of the country. Nearly every household in the United States
turns on its television set during any given day. When a change occurs in
the provision of that entertainment, the result impacts viewers personally
and noticeably. Through its viewership, the general public puts pressure
on the striking parties to resolve their disputes. Viewership is evaluated
in terms of ratings for each particular program. As consumers of the
programming who manifest their viewing preferences and dislikes, the
public directly influences the behavior of the parties to the strike. Each
rating point is worth approximately ninety million dollars per season in
national advertising. 1 ' During the 1988 strike, sponsors chose to delay
expenditures for advertising to avoid spending their advertising dollars
99. Glenn Collins, The Ways Writers Are Weathering the Strike. N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1988, at CIS.
100. Id.
101. Mark Dawidziak, Cable TV Won Pot in Strike Gamble, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1989, at
CIS.
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during reruns of a program with lower viewership."02 Cutting off the
flow of money to networks and producers is an effective method of apply-
ing pressure that both sides recognize.
In the entertainment industry, the labor model works as it was
designed to work. In general, equal balance of power appears to be a
given, with the high stakes ensuring that each side resists making costly
concessions. When the cost of the disagreement surpasses the cost of the
compromise, the parties settle. This description over-simplifies the eco-
nomic, social and political factors involved in most negotiations, but it is
generally accurate from an economic standpoint. Often, the damage oc-
curs between the points of disagreement and settlement. Although most
harmful consequences are foreseeable, damages to tangential industries
may occur that are not immediately obvious. Mentioning the 1988 writ-
ers' strike, for example, still elicits stories from proprietors of dry clean-
ers and restauranteurs who blame the strike for their failed businesses."°3
Most writers would not have imagined that the strike would cause these
consequences.
Hollywood is basically a company town; its labor strife is analogous
to disputes in mill towns in the Mid-West regions and East Coast. When
strikes occur in company towns, their impact intensifies with a greater
number of workers in the area dependent on the striking industry. In
Hollywood, jobs that are directly related to the production of films and
television are the first to be affected. In the 1988 strike, however, the
reverberations went much further. Talent agencies were forced to turn
away clients and many closed. Film editors and developers engaged in
price wars vying for the little business that existed." 4 The WGA strike,
for example, "clobbered more than 200,000 members of the real working
class--dry cleaners, technicians, restaurant workers and others."' ' In
effect, the 9000 members of the WGA closed the companies of movie
producers and shut down the company town of Hollywood.106
102. Robert Goldrich, Producers Access Spot Climate After WGA Strike, BACK STAGE,
Aug. 12, 1988, at 1; Darcy Eikenberg, An Insider's Guide to What Really Happened During
the Summer of 1988; Television Commercial Industry, BACK STAGE, Sept. 2, 1988, at 1.
103. Peter Carbonara, Negotiating Peace with Honor in Hollywood, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb.
1989, at 43; Eisendrath, supra note 21.
104. Goldrich, supra note 104, at 2.
105. Eisendrath, supra note 21, at 19.
106. Carbonara, supra note 103. "When 9,000 members of the Writers Guild of America
went on strike.., they didn't just shut down all the major television and film studios; they
shut down the city. Power restaurants like Spago and Le Dome sat empty as meetings went
untaken. The dry cleaning business fell off as writers throughout Hollywood decided to wait
that extra week. Some typing and messenger services closed altogether... 'the veterinary
business went down fifty percent .... ,'" Id
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As in many other company towns, tension exists in Hollywood be-
tween labor and management, especially during strikes. During the 1988
writers' strike, both sides strove to bypass the other by using outside
services. Producers took production out of Hollywood to keep the cam-
eras rolling through the employment of nonunion workers. 10 7 Lorimar
Telepictures sent executives "to England to look into hiring British writ-
ers for its television shows."' 0 The WGA, for its part, endeavored to
sign agreements with both Alliance and non-Alliance producers.
Although the WGA succeeded in these efforts, it failed to split the
Alliance. 0 9
When the 1988 strike settled, neither management nor labor actu-
ally won. Rather, cable and independent producers succeeded in taking
over a large share of the market,"' maintaining significantly increased
levels in the ratings."' Ironically, competition from independent produ-
cers and cable stations was one of the fears that had led to the strike in
the first place. As a result of the five-month writers' strike, both net-
works and studios suffered significant losses. The networks lost an irre-
trievable part of their already shrinking audience to cable and
independent stations." 2 The studios lost approximately six million dol-
lars in direct fees and residuals."
3
3. The Federal Law Is in What State?
The WGA actions regarding unfair labor practices which were at
issue in the American Broadcasting case also led to a suit by an individual
who was affected by the Guild's "threats."'" 4 Although not actually dis-
ciplined by the WGA, writer-producer Steven Bochco brought an action
in state court on behalf of himself and eleven other individuals. They
alleged that the WGA's constitution and bylaws did not permit its ac-
107. Writers Guild Membership Approves Pact with Pnducerm Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
153, at A-14 (Aug. 9, 1988).
108. Aijean Harmetz, Dissident Writers Aim for Forced Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1988, at
C20.
109. Writers Reach Tentative Agreement with Film and Television Producers, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 151, at A-10 (Aug. 5, 1988).
110. Michael Stremfel, Writers Strike Rates Well with Independent Stations, L.A. Bus. J.,
July 11, 1988, § 1, at 5; Striking Writers Guild Approves New Interim Pact with Independent
Producers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at A-18 (July 11, 1988).
111. Dawidziak, supra note 101. "The best cards were dealt to basic cable, pay cable and
independent stations, which walked away from the table with a huge ratings boost .. ." Id.
112. Jeremy Gerard, The Media Business; Hollywood Still Feels Writers' Walkout, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1989, at A38.
113. Id.
114. Writers Guild v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1975).
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tions during the strike because the WGA had no authority to regulate the
behavior of individuals in roles other than as writers. The WGA's at-
tempts to prohibit hyphenates from performing their primary jobs as su-
pervisors interfered with their contracts and business relationships. In
essence, the Bochco complaint alleged that WGA members were denied
rights guaranteed to them by section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act when the Guild coerced them into engaging in strike activities.115
Section 7 guarantees union members the right to choose not to join the
strike and prohibits unions from forcing members to forgo this right.
The claim would have been valid under the American Broadcasting
decision, if Bochco had ified suit in the proper court. The federal law-
the National Labor Relations Act, preempted the state court from decid-
ing the facts. Thus, the court instead analyzed the relationship between
the Act and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959116 ("LMRDA"). Although the NLRA preempts state law, the
LMRDA does not. Therefore, state court remedies are available for
members of labor organizations with union constitutions and bylaws for
conduct violating the LMRDA."1 The Court found that the WGA's
coercive actions were arguably an unfair labor practice within the juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board, and thus the state court's
jurisdiction was preempted."' Under the Court's decision, if it may be
reasonably asserted that the conduct called into question is subject to the
Board's jurisdiction, a state court's power to decide the case is pre-
empted. Although a basis for relief from unfair labor practices was avail-
able to the plaintiffs, the parties were in the wrong forum. Consequently,
the Court granted the Guild's writ of prohibition, dismissing the claim.
4. Post-Strike Litigation Finds WGA Rules Unlawful
Subsequent strikes brought more litigation after 1988. The Ameri-
can Broadcasting case was brought by producers alleging that they had
been subjected to unfair labor practices. A related issue, concerning the
validity of the WGA's resignation rules, was conspicuously absent in
American Broadcasting. If the issue had been raised, the strike rules
which limited the employee's power to resign from the union would have
115. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1992). Section 7 of the Act states, in part: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
... and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ... ." Id
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1992).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 472.
118. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274 (1971).
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been held invalid under a 1985 Supreme Court case, Pattern Makers
League v. NLRB ("Pattern Makers"). "9
A union is free to enforce its rules regarding resignations from the
union, provided that the rules meet certain criteria. First, the rules must
be reasonably enforced 2 ° and take into consideration legitimate union
interests. Second, the rules must be properly adopted and, under the
decision of Pattern Makers, are valid only if they allow members to es-
cape the union's reach by resignation.12' The Court in Pattern Makers
held that the union could not fine non-members for resignation or pro-
hibit members from resigning even if the resignation was to avoid sanc-
tions by the union.
In a similar lawsuit, the National Labor Relations Board examined
the constitution and bylaws of the WGA to determine whether it had
imposed unlawful restrictions on the rights of members to resign or al-
lowed unlawful disciplinary actions subsequent to any resignation.1
22 Of
the twenty-two union members who brought this action, none had at-
tempted to resign or been subjected to discipline. In its ruling, the Board
noted that all of them had been advised by counsel that the WGA rules
were unlawful. The Board found, however, that the members had not
worked within the system of the WGA to change the rules prior to insti-
tuting their action.
In an earlier case, the Board had had little trouble in determining
that the actions of the WGA were unlawful. 123 Applying a per se rule
requiring all members to have an unqualified right to resign from a
union, the Board concluded that any restriction on a member's right to
resign was unlawful. Several WGA rules proved offensive. These rules
forbade resignations during negotiations or strikes and provided that
only members in good standing with the union could tender their resig-
nations. The rules further provided that even a proper resignation by a
member in good standing did not always end the relationship. If a strike
ensued within twenty-one days of the attempt to resign, the member re-
mained bound by all of the strike rules and subject to the disciplinary
provisions set forth in the WGA's constitution. 21
119. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
120. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
121. Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
122. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 132 L.R.R.M. 1291, 297 NLRB No. 12, (Oct.
12, 1989).
123. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 1414, 270
N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
124. Article IV, section 8, governing resignations provides in part:
By accepting membership in the Guild members agree that the continuation of mem-
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The Board found that the WGA had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act, which guarantees employees the right to refrain from collective
action. The WGA was ordered to expunge these rules from its constitu-
tion and bylaws, and post a notice in its office and meeting halls, stating
that the Board had found these provisions violative of the Act and had
mandated their deletion from the constitution.
5. Tensions in and out of the Union
Hollywood's 1988 breakdown in labor negotiations and subsequent
strike by the Writers Guild of America was distinctive due to the ten-
sions within the union and animosity toward the Alliance of Motion Pic-
ture and Television Producers. The Alliance represents some two-
hundred producers, including all of the major studios and networks. On
behalf of those producers, the Alliance negotiates individually with each
of the different unions in the industry. They have seized this opportunity
to practice "pattern bargaining." '125 Pattern bargaining is the strategy of
using a concession extracted from one union as leverage to get the same
concession from another union in a subsequent negotiation.
In the 1950's and 1960's, pattern bargaining became the norm in
several goods-producing industries.126 Although the practice was preva-
lent until the 1980's, it is rarely practiced in labor negotiations today.
The Alliance, however, has defied the trend by commencing the use of
pattern bargaining in the 1980's-to the dismay of the writers.' 27 It is
not well-received by the unions, and has added to the acrimony between
bership status and the applicability of discipline to all members, especially during
times of negotiation with employers or during strikes by the Guild is essential to their
welfare and necessary for solidarity and to achieve the objectives of the Guild...
a. Only members who are in good standing... may tender their resignation
c. If... a member tenders his/her resignation during a strike in the industry
... his/her resignation shall not relieve the member of his/her obligation to observe
the Guild strike rules . . . for the duration of such and related strikes, and such
member shall remain subject to Article X (Discipline) for the duration of such and
related strikes.
Writers Guild Basic Agreement.
125. Glenn Collins, The Ways Writers Are Weathering the Strike, N.Y. TiMEs, May 23,
1988, at C18.
126. New Theories on Negotiations and Disputes Resolution, and the Changing Role of Medi-
ation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at F-i (Jan. 17, 1990).
"The experience of some U.S. industries with the disintegration of pattern bargaining is
not isolated but rather shared by most Western European nations." Despite Obstacles, Collec-
tive Bargaining Worldwide "Remarkably" Healthy, IMF Told, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
243, at A-5 (Dec. 18, 1986).
127. Anne Thompson, No End Seems in Sight for Film Writers' Strike, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7,
1988, at DI5. "The writers [did] not believe in 'pattern bargaining,' that what is good for the
directors should be good enough for them." Id.
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the two sides.
28
In 1988, the Alliance went to the negotiating table with concessions
from the Directors Guild of America as part of its first proposal to the
writers.' 29 The directors (and actors) had agreed to accept the Alliance's
reduced formulas despite the fact that they viewed them as wage roll-
backs; the Alliance asked for the same concessions from the writers. The
writers refused to approve what had been acceptable to the directors.
1 30
Their refusal strained relations with the other unions, and resulted in a
strike. To those outside the labor system, a strike symbolizes a break-
down of the system. Strikes, however, are intended to operate as an inte-
gral part of the labor model. The strike, the negotiations, and the
agreement were all indicators of the healthy operation of the system in
Hollywood.
As stated previously, the purpose of the federal labor legislation was
to equalize power where the parties exhibited unequal bargaining
strengths. Congress found that the existing inequality created a situation
that impeded commerce, and sought a model structure to equalize the
positions of the parties. At present, it appears that the powers in
Hollywood have been equalized. The Alliance is a powerful unit, but the
WGA is a formidable opponent. In 1988, the WGA was able to maintain
its strike with regard to certain issues on the bargaining table, and the
Alliance was strong enough to let them walk out and virtually shut down
the industry. Eventually, the parties returned to the bargaining table,
however, feeling the pressure brought on by their actions. As a testa-
ment to the system, their negotiations produced a contract acceptable to
both sides. The strike's impact was felt by both parties and left neither
side eager for a repeat breakdown.
In the year following the writers' strike, both the SAG and AFTRA
reached individual agreements with the Alliance months before their
contracts expired. Interestingly, the craft unions such as the Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees offered contract proposals
that included voluntary concessions mirroring the concessions that the
Alliance had obtained from the writers and directors in previous negotia-
tions.' 3' The voluntary offering of concessions prior to the beginning of
formal negotiations is most often seen during times of severe financial
128. Carbonara, supra note 103, at 43. "The antagonism between labor and management in
Hollywood has deeper roots. The producers have long taken a scorched-earth policy with
regard to unions. A favorite tactic is 'pattern bargaining,' dealing with each talent or craft
guild individually and trying to play them one off the other." Id.
129. Carbonara, supra note 103, at 43.
130. Thompson, supra note 128.
131. Bernstein, supra note 17.
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problems in an industry. For example, the impending bankruptcy of
Chrysler Corporation in 1979 created concession negotiations where pat-
tern bargaining had been the norm. Concession negotiations were preva-
lent in the early 1980's, but by the mid-1980's the unions were making up
for their losses.
132
It is interesting to contrast the entertainment industry to the steel or
automobile industries and the union problems they have endured. Bar-
gaining in both latter industries intensified because of poor economic
conditions. Unions in the rust belt made concessions with the under-
standing that to do otherwise would destroy the industry and all of the
jobs. The impetus for concessions in Hollywood, however, was not a
desire to save the industry from financial destruction but the belief that
Hollywood was flush with cash. 133 All parties were jockeying to insure
their part of the growing financial pie by taking all necessary measures to
avoid the possibility of another strike. SAG members suffering from the
fallout of the writers' strike were trying to avoid another, similar blow to
their union, the film industry, and the city.'
34
6. The Guild Pauses to Look at Commas
The grievance arbitration process that operates in the entertainment
industry is another aspect of labor relations uniquely applied in
Hollywood. Grievance arbitrations in all industries traditionally center
around disputes regarding conditions of employment, the rights and obli-
gations of management, and the rights and responsibilities of the union.
The WGA's agreement is typical in its provisions governing the handling
of these grievances. What is unique are the WGA's rules providing for
the routine determination of credits for film or television productions
through the arbitration process. This process is best illustrated by exam-
ining an actual arbitration involving the designation of writing credits on
a television show.
In In re Lorimar-Telepictures Productions, Inc. and the Writers
Guild of America, West, Inc., 135 ("Lorimar") the proper designation of
132. DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRA-
TION, 41-52 (2d ed. 1979).
133. Matthew Heller, Hollywood Hit by Rash of Labor Showdowns, REUTERS Bus. REP.,
Mar. 15, 1988. In 1987, "a record $4.2 billion was spent at the theatrical box office, and new
secondary markets for T.V. and film products such as home video and cable are expanding all
the time." Id.
134. Martin Kasindorf, NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 1989, Part II, at 2. One SAG member
summed up the SAG stance by saying, "This town can't stand another strike like last sum-
mer." Id.
135. 90 Lab. Arb. 1115 (1988) (Christopher, Arb.).
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credits for a television show was arbitrated. The dispute involved the use
of commas, the conjunction "and" and the ampersand ("&") in the cred-
its for an episode of "Max Headroom."1 3 6 While this type of disagree-
ment may not be debated often by labor arbitrators across the country,
its outcome is hardly inconsequential to Hollywood.
The WGA's operation with regard to television credits is unlike any
other system in a union. Its role begins when the producer of a television
show submits a "Notice of Tentative Writing Credits" to the WGA. In
its case, Lorimar submitted proposed credits consisting of the names of
four writers, in teams of twos, for an episode of a weekly series. The
WGA determined that the writing credits were correct as proposed. It
notified Lorimar that it could broadcast the credits exactly in the form
Lorimar had set forth: "Written by Martin Pasko & Rebecca Parr and
Steve Roberts & Michael Cassutt."' 
37
Further, the WGA notice stipulated that on-screen placement was
to be governed by its Basic Agreement, and emphasized the distinction
between the ampersand and the conjunction "and." The WGA Agree-
ment provides that the ampersand is to designate a writing team, while
"and" designates writers working separately. In the initial broadcast of
the show, the company presented the writing credits as follows: "Writ-
ten by Martin Pasko, Rebecca Parr, Steve Roberts, Michael Cassutt."
The company used commas instead of the ampersand and conjunction
"and," as the WGA had mandated. 3 The WGA brought the action to
correct and enforce the proper listing of credits.
Lorimar did not endear itself to the WGA or the arbitrator by argu-
ing that what had occurred was a "hypertechnical violation."' 39 When
writers work together simultaneously on a production and create mate-
rial that is not separable, the writers are a team, designated with the
ampersand. Writers working independently are listed in the credits with
"and" between their names. Although two separate teams worked on the
Lorimar production, the broadcast did not indicate this. Lorimar's fail-
ure to clarify the manner in which the writers worked caused the writers
to receive improper credit for their work.
The WGA's complaints reflected its primary concern: to protect the
integrity of its unique role in the industry and in the area of labor law in
general. The WGA argued that allowing Lorimar to ignore the WGA
136. Max Headroom is an episodic television production which aired for a short period on
ABC. Id.
137. 90 Lab. Arb. 1115 (1988).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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standards in its Agreement denied the WGA the benefit of its bargain.
Pursuant to the Agreement, the WGA is obligated to determine proper
writing credits. Lorimar, as a signatory to the contract, agreed to abide
by the WGA's final determinations.
The WGA rules also provide for an expedited procedure for hearing
objections to credit listings."4 In this case, the Lorimar producer did not
object to the improper listing, but broadcast the credits incorrectly.
Lorimar's decision not to adhere to the WGA precise designation of the
credits violated the Agreement. The use of "and" and the ampersand to
designate the way in which writers work is an accepted custom in the
industry. The arbitrator noted that this practice had resulted in the
grammatical formula becoming part of the contract. 141 People in the in-
dustry rely on and understand the system, and allowing a violation of the
rule harms the WGA as well as the credited individuals involved. The
broadcasting of credits has an economic impact that cannot be over-
looked, and the WGA seeks to assure parties the benefit of their bargain.
The majority of the people in the industry work as independents on one
contract at a time. Proper credit designations are vitally important be-
cause they become part of their ongoing portfolio or resume.
The Minimum Basic Agreement allowed the WGA to recover dam-
ages on its own behalf, with the basis of the damage award being injury
to the WGA's institutional role in arbitration. The parties to the WGA
Agreement fashioned the arbitrations system because of "the Guild's
unique role, as a union, in [the] industry." 4 ' WGA's arbitration deter-
minations and efforts contribute to the productions from which the em-
ployer or production materially benefits.143 That benefit contrasts with
the loss in power suffered by the WGA as an institution in enforcing the
provisions over which it has been vested with authority. Offering an ar-
bitration service naturally incurs costs, and seeking enforcement of its
decisions is also costly.
Despite these considerations, the arbitrator found that the WGA
had failed to show a monetary loss. The arbitrator concluded, however,
that the fact that damages could not be quantified in dollars did not deny
a basis for compensation. The arbitrator granted the WGA's request for
140. Article V of the Guild Basic Agreement deals with "Grievance and Arbitration Rules
and Procedures." Part E of this article deals with "Arbitration of Disputes Concerning Credit
Provisions" and provides for an expedited arbitration proceeding.
141. 90 Lab. Arb. at 1119.
142. Id
143. Id at 1120.
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two thousand dollars in damages. More importantly, the ruling estab-
lished a significant precedent.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHY Do WE WATCH STEEL AND AUTOMOBILES
BUT NOT HOLLYWOOD?
Labor law scholars contemplate different negotiating strategies, pat-
terns in bargaining processes, and the changes in an industry that alter
negotiations.'" During the early 1980's, the automobile and steel indus-
tries shifted from pattern bargaining to concession bargaining because of
the economic problems troubling those industries. The shift in bargain-
ing patterns resulted in the publication of studies, books, and articles.
145
When the same unions tried to regain ground and offset their past con-
cessions, questions about the future of concession bargaining ap-
peared. 1" These industries draw academic scrutiny because they are
bastions for labor, vital to the economy of the country, and powerful.
Because the entertainment industry unions exhibit all three of these as-
pects, it is a prime area for study as well.
The steel and automobile industries have received considerable
scholarly attention that has resulted in knowledgeable works on labor
law. Hollywood has spawned unionization at every level of the industry,
beginning in 1919 with the "White Rats"-the first actors' union and
first union in the movie industry. 4 The differences between the en-
tertainment industry and the rust belt industries of the country are obvi-
ous. However, the factors warranting study of the rust belt industries,
such as the impact of the industry on the economy and the role of labor
in the industry, are found in the entertainment industry and provide
strong reasons for exploring their labor relations.
144. Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "Industrial Policy" in American Development, 1790-
1987, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1516 (1987); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Law: Trade Fric-
tion with Japan and the American Policy Response, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1647, 1652 (1984).
145. R. MACDONALD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY, 219-
220 (1964); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, (3d ed. 1986); MORGAN
REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: LABOR UNIONS IN AMERICA 56-74 (1984); Charles B.
Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 465, 478 (1988); William Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Move-
ment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1135, 1232 (1989); Arthur S. Leonard, Specific Performance
of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 198 (1983).
146. Douglas A. Fraser, Era of Breakthroughs in Job Security and Worker Participation, 14
U. TOL. L. REv. 255 (1983); Thomas Miner, Concession Bargaining, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
981 (1983); Lacombe & Conley, Collective Bargaining Calendar Crowded Again in 1984,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 1984, at 29.
147. THE MOVIE BUSINESS, AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE, supra note 15. In
memory of my sister Linda. Her belief in me and excitement that I wanted to be a lawyer
remain my inspiration. She shares in a joy she didn't live to see.
LABOR LAW
Hollywood does not operate in a vacuum in labor law any more
than it does in any other area. A number of factors peculiar to the indus-
try have added to the success of the system. A few of these factors in-
clude the high visibility of the industry and the employees in it, and the
impact of public interest on the labor process in Hollywood. To attribute
the success of the system to these factors alone is to oversimplify the
analysis, but to deny that they affect the participants, both at and away
from the negotiating table is foolhardy. The collective bargaining agree-
ments that are reached and used in the entertainment industry are
unique, but effective. Negotiations, strikes, and agreements are all part
of the labor system. In the entertainment industry in Hollywood, the
system functions as it was intended to, which seems a rarity in itself.
Although unionization in this country is declining, union activity is
healthy and viable in Hollywood. This indicates that the National Labor
Relations Act can successfully encourage growth of unions, while simul-
taneously allowing management to maintain sufficient and equal bargain-
ing power.
The industry has prospered to the point of being an asset to the
country and a positive addition to the balance of trade. A significant
amount was learned from the study of labor relations in the automobile
industry, both before and since the Japanese markets have threatened the
industry. The entertainment industry is facing a number of global issues
and competition similar to those faced by the automobile industry. As a
large component of the entertainment industry, labor has a vital role in
determining the outcome of the industry.*
* In memory of my sister Linda. Her belief in me and excitement that I wanted to be a
lawyer remain my inspiration. She shares in a joy she didn't live to see.
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